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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright’s fundamental structure is based on outdated assumptions, including 
that marginal costs of copying and distribution are high, and registration systems 
necessarily onerous and expensive.1  International treaties embedded these 
assumptions into domestic laws worldwide, and for good reasons:  when the Berne 
Convention prohibited formalities in 1908, it was a necessary response to 
compulsory registration systems that unfairly burdened authors.2  And, when those 
high marginal costs meant only the most popular works could be made enduringly 
available anyway, there was little downside in granting long terms that could 
outlast their owners’ interest:  those less popular works were going to be lost 
regardless.3 
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 1.  For a fuller analysis of the “physical world” assumptions on which copyright is based, see 
generally REBECCA GIBLIN, CODE WARS (2011); Rebecca Giblin, Physical World Assumptions and 
Software World Realities (and Why There Are More P2P Software Providers than Ever Before), 35 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 57 (2011).  
 2. 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING 
RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 18-19, 96 (2d ed. 2006). 
 3. See Mark Twain’s testimony to the US Congress, reprinted at https://perma.cc/S6FR-SE23; 
Rebecca Giblin, Reimagining Copyright’s Duration, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 
177, 178 (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017). 
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These assumptions no longer hold good (at least for those with digital access).  
Registrations can occur cheaply and almost instantaneously online.  The 
information age brought with it the widespread ability to copy and distribute many 
kinds of work—globally, virtually instantaneously, for close to zero marginal 
cost—making the deadweight loss caused by too-long copyrights precipitously 
larger.4 
Copyright law would no doubt look very different if we were to design it from 
scratch today, unconstrained by existing ways of doing things, vested interests, and 
the international treaty framework.5  Kimberlee Weatherall and I recently led a 
project to explore what such a reimagined copyright could look like.  The core 
lessons that emerged?  That any copyright system we were to create today would 
be much better targeted towards protecting authors’ interests; would not leave 
availability and access so much to chance; and would impose reasonable reciprocal 
obligations along with rights.6  
That thought experiment was a useful exercise for understanding what current 
approaches cause us to lose, but as we explained in our conclusions, any wholesale 
reimagining would be impossible to implement in practice.7  Leaving aside the 
powerful lobbying power of the biggest beneficiaries of existing approaches, 
crucial reform pathways are permanently blocked by the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supported (and made enforceable in the 
World Trade Organisation) by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).  While Berne was intended to be revised 
regularly to keep up with changing circumstances, it has now been almost half a 
century since Berne has seen any substantive change.8  Regulators and scholars 
have sometimes assumed Berne can be modified, albeit with difficulty,9 but that’s 
simply not feasible given 170+ veto-wielding member nations with their wide 
range of often competing interests.  As Sam Ricketson writes in this volume, 
“you’re dreaming!” if you imagine likely any revisions to Berne.10  Walking away 
isn’t an option either, since that would mean loss of reciprocal global protection 
 
 4. Fixed costs of production are sometimes also reduced in this new paradigm—e.g., in the case 
of digital photographs.  For other forms of work, however, such as books, they remain high, since 
technological improvements do little to reduce the intensive cost of the main input—the actual writing. 
 5. See generally WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT?, supra note 3. 
 6. Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall, A Collection of Impossible Ideas, in WHAT IF WE 
COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT?, supra note 3, at 315, 316-19.  
 7. Id. at 319-24. 
 8. Berne was most recently amended in 1979, and its most recent substantive revision was the 
Paris Act in 1971.  
 9. See, e.g., DANIEL GERVAIS, (RE)STRUCTURING COPYRIGHT:  A COMPREHENSIVE PATH TO 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT REFORM (Edward Elgar ed., 2017); PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, 
“INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS: PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION DRAFT REPORT” 117 (April 
2016), https://perma.cc/CJ28-36JX.  The Productivity Commission removed references to this 
possibility in its final report after receiving submissions as to the unlikelihood of this eventuality.  See 
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, “INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS: PRODUCTIVITY 
COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT” 131 (Sept. 2016), https://perma.cc/4DB9-SP97. 
 10. Sam Ricketson, The International Framework for the Protection of Authors: Bendable 
Boundaries and Immovable Obstacles, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 341, 353 (2018) (citing iconic 
Australian film “The Castle”). 
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and ejection from the WTO.11  Even new parallel international arrangements are 
impossible (barred by Article 20 to the extent of inconsistency), and TRIPS is 
proving virtually unamendable too.12  There are other international agreements that 
limit discretion over copyright, including the Internet treaties and various “free 
trade” agreements, but they are much easier to amend or withdraw from.  By 
contrast, Berne and TRIPS effectively define copyright’s hard limits.  If we want 
copyright to better achieve its aims, we must work within their boundaries. 
While Berne and TRIPS do preclude many options for reform, there are 
nonetheless opportunities to navigate their gaps and flexibilities in order to secure a 
different bargain—one better capable of responding to the challenges of this age.  
The key, as I develop below, lies in disentangling copyright’s incentives and 
rewards motivations and updating its core assumptions.  The treaties do indeed 
present certain “immovable obstacles,”13 but that doesn’t necessarily require us to 
take precisely the same approaches that we have in the past.  This paper seeks to 
provoke new thinking about the possibilities for doing things differently, to better 
achieve our aims, within the existing treaty structure.  
The analysis proceeds in five parts.  Part I highlights the failures of current 
approaches by evaluating them against copyright’s fundamental aims.  Part II 
develops the failed assumptions on which those approaches are constructed, and 
proposes updated alternatives with which they might be replaced.  Informed by 
those failures and lessons, Part III then sketches an alternative bargain which seeks 
to better secure to authors rewards from their copyrights whilst simultaneously 
reclaiming much of the culture lost under current approaches.  Part IV briefly 
addresses possibilities for undermining (and expanding) that proposed alternative, 
before Part V concludes.  
The paper’s aim is not to evangelise for the adoption of this model—significant 
empirical work is necessary before any responsible advocacy can occur.  Rather, it 
is to provoke new thought about the possibilities for achieving meaningful reform, 
in ways that reflect current social and technological realities, without requiring 
impossible textual change. 
I. EVALUATING CURRENT APPROACHES 
There is no single coherent normative rationale for copyright:  as Sherman and 
Bently explain, “the emergence of modern intellectual property law was neither 
 
 11. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 41-61, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] (providing that the instruments in Annex 1, 
of which TRIPS is one, are integral parts and binding on all members).  Note also that withdrawal from 
Berne will not re-enliven the Universal Copyright Convention, because of that treaty’s special clauses 
applying to former Berne states.  See Universal Copyright Convention, as revised at Paris on July 24, 
1971, with Appendix Declaration relating to Article XVII and Resolution concerning Article XI 1971, 
Appendix Declaration relating to Article XVII, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 (1971), 
https://perma.cc/NUD6-UC8V.  
 12. Giblin & Weatherall, supra note 6, at 322-23. 
 13. Ricketson, supra note 10. 
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natural nor inevitable, nor was it an example of the law coming to occupy its proper 
philosophical position.”14  That leaves room for numerous rationales and 
explanations:  that it is intended to recognize the fruits of authors’ intellectual 
labor,15 provide incentives to create and disseminate works for the greater public 
benefit,16 enhance democratic civil society,17 protect against unfair competition,18 
or guarantee investors’ rights to exploit in any markets they choose.19  
Having said that, however, two rationales stand ahead of the rest in justifying 
copyright policies over time.  Mapping to historical “instrumentalist” and 
“naturalist” theories of copyright, they boil down to being about incentives and 
rewards.  Instrumentalist theories justify copyright as a way of achieving social and 
economic aims, putting the public interest at the forefront.  Naturalist approaches 
assume that authors’ contributions of intellectual labor or personality give rise to 
rights to rewards in their own right (and arguably above and beyond the amount 
necessary to incentivise the work).20  No jurisdiction today can plausibly claim to 
be purely consequentialist or deontological in its approach to copyright:  
considerations traceable to both rationales coexist within both international treaties 
and domestic laws.21 
Incentives are intended not to encourage production of and investment in 
cultural works as aims in and of themselves, but to achieve the broader social 
benefits that flow from widespread access to knowledge and culture.  Thus, 
incentive aims are more properly conceptualised as access aims.22  That is one 
reason why copyright does not seek to secure the whole value of the copyright to 
owners.  Some parts of all works are always reserved for the benefit of the public, 
including the ideas within them, de minimis or non-substantial takings, and 
tolerated or excepted uses.  
 
 14. BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760–1911 141 (1999). 
 15. See, e.g., Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall, If We Redesigned Copyright from Scratch, 
What Might it Look Like?, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT?, supra note 3, at 1, 16-17.   
 16. See e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. 
 17. See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE 
L.J. 283 (1996). 
 18. MARK J. DAVISON ET AL., AUSTRALIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4-5 (2d ed. 2012). 
 19. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 176 (2002). 
 20. Giblin & Weatherall, supra note 15, at 16-17.   
 21. Id. at 17.  For a discussion of how these aims have animated global copyright policymaking, 
see, e.g., MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST (2004), 
especially 6–10.  Ginsburg’s historical analysis demonstrates how even the United States, which 
professes such a strong utilitarian tradition, has been influenced by “authors’” claims of personal right.  
See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and 
America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 995 (1990).  See also Alain Strowel, Droit d’auteur et copyright, 
Divergences et Convergences (Bruylant, 1993); GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 348-51 (2d ed., 2002); J. H. Reichman, Duration of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural 
Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625, 643-44 (1996); Sam Ricketson, The Copyright Term, 23 
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 753, 755 (1992); Alfred C, Yen, Restoring the National Law:  
Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990). 
 22. Giblin, supra note 3, at 198. 
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Rewards are granted to creators in recognition of their contributions of 
personality and intellectual labor.23  As Ricketson explains:  “[t]here is a strong 
moral argument . . . that as authors confer benefits on society through their creative 
activity—the provision of learning, instruction and entertainment—this 
contribution should be duly rewarded.”24  
That is why, even if we could induce desired cultural production for relatively 
small incentives (or even none at all), that does not mean that’s where the grant of 
rights should end.  Authors additionally deserve some of the additional social 
surplus of their creations.  Those moral claims are what make author-favoring 
rhetoric so powerful and effective.25 
While copyright doubtless has other rationales, those around incentives and 
rewards have had the most enduring power in justifying copyright policy over 
time.26  Thus, copyright law is predominantly sold as a means of: 
1. Incentivizing initial cultural production (so that society benefits from access 
to knowledge and culture); 
2. Incentivizing ongoing investment in existing works (to ensure their 
preservation and continued availability – those access aims again); and 
3. Rewarding authors for their creative contributions. 
As I have analyzed elsewhere however, current approaches do a poor job of 
achieving these aims.27  It is worth recapping the reasons for that in some detail, 
since understanding the failures of the current system is necessary to understanding 
how we might achieve better results. 
A. WHAT IS NECESSARY TO INCENTIVIZE INITIAL CULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(SO THAT SOCIETY CAN BENEFIT FROM ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE AND 
CULTURE)? 
Incentivizing works’ initial production is a purely economic aim.  How much 
protection is necessary to elicit those investments?  A number of inputs affect this, 
but two are particularly significant:  the discounting necessary to reflect the time 
value of money, and rates of cultural depreciation. 
The “time value of money” recognizes that the further away in time a benefit 
will be received, the less it is currently worth.28  Thus, the promise of $100 next 
week is worth much more to us today than the promise of $100 in a decade’s time.  
 
 23. Canvassing the possible reasons for this intuition, see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for 
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
281, 284-91 (1970). 
 24. Ricketson, supra note 21, at 757.  
 25. For a detailed tracing of the ways in which the concept of authorship has been used to 
promote particular positions in legal discourse, including in ways directly contrary to authors’ interests, 
see Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; 
Rebecca Giblin, Should it be copyright’s role to fill houses with books?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND THE REGULATION OF THE INTERNET 18-19 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2017). 
 26. Giblin, supra note 25, at 18. 
 27. Giblin, supra note 3, at 179-96. 
 28. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at 4, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) [hereinafter Economists’ Brief]. 
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You do not have to be an economist to grasp this concept.  Just imagine that you 
are interviewing housemates, and they offer the same amount in rent—but one 
would pay monthly in advance, and the other five years after they move out.  The 
difference in value is readily apparent. 
A group of prominent economists demonstrated how the time value of money 
affects investment incentives in their Brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft.  Assuming a real interest rate (net of inflation) of seven percent, they 
showed that a dollar today is worth $0.93 if received in a year, just $0.0045 if 
received in eighty years and a mere $0.0012 if it’s going to take a century to end up 
in one’s pocket.29  Thus, years of protection far in the future have little or no 
additional incentive value even if works continue generating a consistent stream of 
royalties over the entire period of copyright (which, as we see in a moment, is 
rarely the case).  
Cultural depreciation also plays an important role in determining the incentives 
necessary to achieve the desired production.  Like new cars and televisions, cultural 
works tend to lose commercial value over time.  Depreciation rates differ across 
categories of work, but historical data show that most works have a short 
commercial lifespan.  The Gowers Report showed that most of sound recordings’ 
commercial value is extracted within ten years of release, while for fiction books, 
sales become negligible within just a single year.30  That helps explain why, when 
the U.S. had renewal-based terms, few owners bothered to actually exercise their 
rights:  just thirteen percent of the copyrights registered between 1923 and 1942 
were actually renewed.31  Using registration and renewal data as the basis of their 
analysis, Landes and Posner have found that the full commercial lifespan of works 
published in 1962 averaged just 18.5 years.32  Of course, other factors also 
contributed to these low renewal rates, including complex administrative hurdles.  
But the point stands that the remaining value of works, as the time for renewal 
approached, was almost always too low to make it worthwhile to leap them. 
Once we discount the value of future earnings to their present value, and account 
for cultural depreciation,33 it becomes clear that the period of exclusivity necessary 
to incentivize initial creation of even the most expensive works is far shorter than 
current copyright terms.  Even with generous assumptions as to discount rate and 
depreciation, the potential to earn money from a work after the first twenty-five 
years would do little or nothing further to persuade a rational investor to invest in a 
work at the time that decision is made.34  Indeed, Pollock’s model, assuming a 
 
 29. Id. at 4-7. 
 30. ANDREW GOWERS, HM TREASURY, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 52 
(2006), available at https://perma.cc/78YV-RN3T. 
 31. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 471, 502 (2003). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Software, for example, has a much higher depreciation rate than feature films, given the speed 
with which it tends to become technologically obsolete. 
 34. Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 476 (“[T]he incremental incentive to create new works as 
a function of a longer term is likely to be very small (given discounting and depreciation) beyond a term 
of twenty-five years or so”). 
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discount rate of six percent and cultural depreciation of five percent (and factoring 
in also the mathematical supply function for creative works, and the welfare 
associated with new works) estimates optimal copyright terms to be just fifteen 
years.35 
The speculative nature of cultural investment does not change this outcome.  It 
is true that investors will often invest in a number of works in the expectation that 
some will make losses and others will make sufficient profit to make the overall 
investment worthwhile.36  But this does not make terms exceeding twenty-five 
years necessary to incentivize those investments, since the vast majority of most 
works’ commercial value is still typically extracted soon after release. 
What all this tells us is that, beyond the first couple of decades, the prospect of 
future earnings has virtually no impact on investment decisions by intermediaries at 
the time those decisions are made.  Even if publishers might like to hold the lottery 
ticket that turns out to hit the jackpot, they do not need it to incentivize their 
investments.37  That explains why, although authors in the U.S. have an inalienable 
right to terminate copyright transfers after thirty-five years, there is no shortage of 
books being published.  It also explains why the empirical evidence does not show 
any increase in cultural production caused by extensions of term to life plus 
seventy.38  
Separately, it is sometimes argued that above-incentive rights are still justifiable 
on incentives rationales because they result in additional investment in other 
cultural works.  The award of above-incentive terms (i.e. those longer than 
necessary to spur works’ creation) can discourage future creativity by making it 
more expensive for subsequent authors to build on those that came before.39  
However, it is sometimes argued that this is more than offset by publishers 
 
 35. Rufus Pollock, Forever Minus a Day? Calculating Optimal Copyright Term, 6(1) REV. ECON. 
RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 35, 56, https://perma.cc/7GS7-BMGS.  Elsewhere, Kretschmer has argued 
for a still shorter initial term of ten years, followed by reversion to the author.  See Martin Kretschmer, 
Copyright Term Reversion and the “Use-it-or-lose-it” Principle, 1 INT’L J. MUSIC BUS. RES. 44, 44-53 
(2012).  
 36. See, e.g., Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the Future of 
Music, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 62 (2011); Steven Bolanos, Note, Knock, Knock, 
Knockin’ on [Congress’s] Door: A Plea to Congress to Amend Section 203 of the Copyright Act of 
1976, 41 WASH. ST. U. L. REV. 391, 398 (2014). 
 37. That’s why the author-focused U.K. publisher Canelo can make money by requiring only 
five-year licenses and guaranteeing authors receive royalties of at least fifty percent of revenues (in 
contrast to the “traditional” publication model, which typically takes a license for the entire term of 
copyright in exchange for a ten percent royalty on e-books).  See Our Offer, CANELO, 
https://perma.cc/8E37-ZM5G. 
 38. See Giblin, supra note 3, at 184.  One study did link the twenty-year term extensions in a 
number of OECD countries to increases in the number of movies produced.  However, ultimately the 
study was never peer-reviewed or published.  See I.P.L. Png & Qiu-hong Wang, Copyright Duration and 
the Supply of Creative Work (September 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://perma.cc/2Y92-FR6U.  
A subsequent (also non-peer-reviewed) paper by the same authors incorporated that research with other 
work they had conducted and “found no statistically robust evidence that copyright term extension was 
associated with higher movie production.”  See I.P.L. Png and Qiu-hong Wang, Copyright Law and the 
Supply of Creative Work: Evidence from the Movies (April 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://perma.cc/UHX6-R3NK. 
 39. Economists’ Brief, supra note 28, at 9. 
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reinvesting their windfall profits in works that they would not otherwise have taken 
a chance on.  To the extent that occurs, it could support the case for longer terms.  
Of course, those investments that would have gone ahead even without those 
windfall profits will not count.  As those same economists argue in their Eldred 
brief, this means that the likely impact of windfall profits in new production is 
small: 
In general, a profit-maximizing producer should fund the set of projects that have an 
expected return equal to or greater than their cost of capital.  If a producer lacks the 
cash on hand to fund a profitable project, the producer can secure additional funding 
from financial institutions or investors.  If the producer has resources remaining, after 
funding all the projects whose expected returns are higher than the cost of capital, this 
remainder should be invested elsewhere, not in sub-par projects that happen to be 
available to the firm.40 
The economists’ argument is that rational producers will only fund projects 
which they expect to be profitable, and then only where the expected return exceeds 
the cost of capital—regardless of whether that money comes from cash at hand or 
other sources.  Of course, this argument disregards works which rational producers 
might fund even if they expect it to make a loss, for example to build prestige or 
other forms of goodwill.  But still, the point is a good one:  a great deal of the 
investment in new works would occur even in the absence of above-incentive 
rewards.41  The main exception is where a producer has no access to capital 
markets.  Consider the individual artist or small publisher who is unable to obtain a 
loan or other source of funding.  In such cases the profits generated from older 
projects may well be the only source of funding for new ones, and may indeed lead 
to investment in creations which could not otherwise have been funded.42 
Overall, this analysis suggests that the grant of additional incentives translates 
poorly into new productions.  It is only in edge cases (where the producer has no 
alternative source of capital) where this is likely to causally link to new investment.  
This tells us that, if we intend copyright to promote investment in works that would 
not otherwise have been created, we need to be more targeted in the allocation of 
rights.  It also tells us that existing approaches award far more than is necessary to 
incentivize even the biggest investments.  If copyright is to be justified beyond an 
initial term of about twenty-five years, it needs to be on other rationales.  
B. TO WHAT EXTENT DO EXISTING APPROACHES INCENTIVIZE ONGOING 
INVESTMENT IN EXISTING WORKS (TO ENSURE THEIR PRESERVATION AND 
CONTINUED AVAILABILITY)? 
Another justification for above-incentive terms is that they might be necessary 
to incentivize copyright owners to continue to invest in existing works, thus 
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ensuring their ongoing availability.  This was one of the explicit reasons given for 
extending U.S. copyright terms in the 1976 Act:  
Although limitations on the term of copyright are obviously necessary, too short a 
term harms the author without giving any substantial benefit to the public.  The public 
frequently pays the same for works in the public domain as it does for copyrighted 
works, and the only result is a commercial windfall to certain users at the author’s 
expense.  In some cases, the lack of copyright protection actually restrains 
dissemination of the work since publishers and other users cannot risk investing in the 
work unless assured of exclusive rights.43 
This reasoning suggests that, although the public has already paid to incentivize 
works to be created, it must then keep paying to persuade the right holder to 
continue to make them available. 
The best empirical evidence in support comes from a study into the effects of 
U.S. copyright law before 1920, which did not recognize copyright in foreign 
books.  The study found evidence that publishers were hesitant to risk the heavy 
financial investments associated with typesetting and printing absent some 
guarantee of exclusivity.44 
More recently however, it has been repeatedly found that works restricted by 
copyright are actually subject to less investment and narrower dissemination than 
their counterparts in the public domain.  For example, research conducted in 2005 
on behalf of the National Recording Preservation Board at the Library of Congress 
examined the exploitation of sound recordings created in the first seventy-five 
years of that medium’s availability.  Under U.S. law, sound recordings pre-dating 
1972 can be protected by a patchwork of state and common law until 2067, with 
the consequence “that there are almost no pre-1972 US sound recordings in the 
public domain across the United States.”45  One of the key rationales for granting 
that lengthy term was to give owners an incentive to invest in making those older 
recordings available to the public.46  Elsewhere, however, those recordings have 
fallen into the public domain.  This gives rise to a natural experiment:  if it is true 
that works will be under-exploited in the absence of copyright, those older 
recordings should have been made more available by their owners, who are not 
 
 43. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 134 (1976) (emphasis added).  See also Copyright Term Extension 
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only likely to have the best access to master copies, but greater incentives to 
produce them thanks to their ongoing monopoly rights.  However, the study found 
that, on average, just fourteen percent of sound recordings published between 1890 
and 1964 had been re-released by right holders on compact disc.  Non-right holders 
re-released twenty-two percent of those recordings without the benefit of any 
monopoly rights—over fifty percent more than those that did.47 
Heald’s study into the impact of copyright protection on the price and 
availability of books over time reached similar findings.  Once again, U.S. law 
provided ideal conditions for the experiment:  books published between 1913 and 
1932 had fallen progressively into the public domain from 1988 until 1997, but a 
twenty-year retroactive extension then ensured books published from 1923 to 1932 
would continue to be restricted by copyright until at least 2018.  If the under-
investment theory were correct, the data should show that the works in the public 
domain were being neglected by comparison to the works that were still subject to 
copyright.  But once again the opposite proved true.  Between 1988 and 2001, the 
public domain books were in print at the same rate as copyrighted books, and after 
2001 they became available at a rate which was “significantly higher.”48  By 2006, 
ninety-eight percent of the public domain sample was in print, compared to just 
seventy-four percent of the copyrighted works.49  Public domain books also 
averaged significantly more editions—6.3 compared to 3.2—and were available to 
the public at significantly lower cost.50  Only a small part of this discrepancy is 
explainable by the lower costs of digital distribution:  there were still 5.2 editions of 
public domain titles available when ebook editions were excluded.51  Heald 
hypothesized that under-exploitation of works in the absence of copyright 
protection was likely only to be a problem where the costs of reproduction and 
distribution are high.52  There is less risk of “ruinous competition” in the case of 
works that are easily and cheaply reproducible.  In the digital world, this includes 
not only books, but also movies, music, photographs, software, music and more. 
In a subsequent study, Heald discovered that copyright seems to actually have a 
negative impact on the availability of books over time.  Using a random sample of 
2,266 new editions of books available for sale on Amazon, and controlling for 
factors such as duplicates and multiple editions of the same title, the availability of 
copyrighted works was found to drop sharply shortly after release, before 
increasing dramatically upon entry to the public domain.53  Indeed, Heald made the 
remarkable discovery that more books were available from the 1880s than from the 
1980s.54  Adjusted for the number of total books actually published in each decade, 
 
 47. Id. at 7–8.  Note that some reissuers may have claimed copyright in the “remastered” 
recordings; other producers claim copyright in the accompanying artwork. 
 48. Heald, supra note 44, at 1040. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1043, 1048–50. 
 51. Id. at 1043. 
 52. Id. at 1050. 
 53. Paul J Heald, How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 829, 
840 (2014). 
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the trend became starker still.55  The lack of availability of print copies is not being 
filled by the ebook market either:  though ninety-four percent of public domain 
“bestsellers” were available in electronic formats, the same was true of just twenty-
seven percent of copyrighted books.56 
The orphan works problem further illustrates what a poor job the blanket grant 
of long terms does of encouraging works’ continued availability.  Countless 
millions are sterilized (in that their DNA cannot become part of future creation) or 
lost altogether because their owners cannot be traced.57  Very often, this is caused 
by works having commercial life spans shorter than their terms of protection.58  
The range of orphaned works in cultural collections is enormous, “spanning 
published books, commercial photographs, journals, newspapers, television shows, 
films, sound recordings, plays and music compositions, as well as email messages, 
home videos, private letters, community pamphlets, postcards, government 
publications and other non-commercial ephemera.”59  Some ninety percent of the 
photographs held by U.K. museums are orphans, as are about thirteen percent of in-
copyright books;60 some E.U. archives claim orphaning rates around forty 
percent.61  Hargreaves decried this state of affairs as “cultural negligence”:  “[a]s 
long as [it] . . . continues, archives in old formats (for instance celluloid film and 
audio tape) continue to decay, and further delay to digitisation means some will be 
lost for good.”62  The phenomenon is by no means limited to old works.  A recent 
project to preserve New Zealand’s early video game heritage, for example, was 
unable to track down the owners of key pieces of software coded as recently as the 
1980s.63  There are people who wish to invest in preserving and disseminating 
these works; preventing them from so doing, in circumstances where their authors 
and owners have themselves lost track of the work, imposes all cost and no benefit 
on society.  By the time such works finally enter the public domain, perhaps more 
than a century from initial creation, many will be irretrievable from physically 
deteriorated and obsolete containers. 
The results of the availability studies referenced above might often also be 
explainable by orphaning.  After all, if a would-be exploiter cannot be sure that 
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they control the rights, or ascertain the identify of those who do, that severely 
curtails possibilities for distribution.  Presumably however, where works have 
sufficient commercial value, rights holders take steps to prevent their falling into 
such lacunae.  That so many owners lose track of their holdings goes to suggest 
how often works’ value falls below that threshold.  
Many other works are not technically orphans but are lost to society nonetheless 
because of what might be described as “parental neglect.”  Owners may so little 
value their copyrighted works that they do not bother making them available 
despite having monopoly rights to do so.  This presents a collective action problem:  
individually, most works are worth too little for owners to bother with, but their 
cumulative lost value to society is huge. 
This evidence about orphaning and neglect demonstrates that, when society 
makes blanket awards of above-incentive rights (partly) in exchange for works’ 
continuing availability, it often achieves the opposite result. 
C. TO WHAT EXTENT DO CURRENT APPROACHES REWARD AUTHORS FOR 
THEIR CREATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS? 
The above analysis shows that, if copyright was simply about incentivising 
initial creation and investments in ongoing availability, terms would only be 
justified for about twenty-five years.  But it is not just about incentives at all.  
Vitally, copyright is also about recognising and rewarding creators.  This 
motivation is reflected in Berne’s adoption of terms based on the author’s lifetime, 
which Ricketson described as “represent[ing] the success of an idea, rooted in 
natural law concepts, that authors have a natural right to property in the fruits of 
their creative endeavours.”64  In the U.S., which boasts a strongly utilitarian 
copyright tradition, it is also reflected in the termination right, which Fromer 
describes as “a powerful signal to authors that copyright law cares about the 
personhood, labor, and possessory interests they have in their work.”65  The power 
and importance of rewards rationales can be seen in how persistently authors’ 
interests have been used to justify broader and longer terms of protection.  For 
example, the rhetoric accompanying the 1998 U.S. term extension focused on the 
desirability of “[a]uthors [being] able to pass along to their children and 
grandchildren the financial benefits of their works.”66  Such arguments are effective 
because they appeal to our inclinations to reward authors for their creative 
contributions. 
These morality-based rewards motivations are what overwhelmingly supports 
the award of rights above that which is necessary to achieve our incentives aims.  
In practice, however, relatively few of copyright’s rewards end up in creators’ 
pockets.  Indeed, such a huge proportion of the benefits of increased protection is 
captured by others in the cultural production chain that authors are sometimes 
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viewed as “stalking horse[s]” to mask other economic interests.67  In the case of the 
U.S. term extension, for example, the beneficiary of the unbargained-for windfall 
from the U.S. term extension was the rights holder at the time it was granted; very 
little was secured to the original author or their heirs.68 
Teasing out the reasons for creators’ poor economic outcomes requires revisiting 
that key tenet of economic incentive theory—that works will be created only if the 
fixed costs of production can be recovered (hence the need to grant exclusive rights 
in the first place).  However, that rule does not always hold good in the context of 
creative labor—a reality which contributes to authors’ poor financial outcomes. 
Creativity is driven by a rich range of motivations, but one of the most powerful 
can be an individual’s intrinsic desire to solve a problem, or tell a story.  Tushnet 
has described how “the desire to create can be excessive, beyond rationality, and 
free from the need for economic incentive.”69  When authors explain why they 
write, they “invoke notions of compulsion, overflowing desire, and other excesses” 
far more commonly than the urge to make money.70  In many cases, those reasons 
“are not the products of conscious choice or rational weighing of utilities.”71  This 
is not to say that a desire to make a living is not also a powerful motivator,72 but it 
does help explain why a great deal of creation occurs independently of economic 
motivations (or, at least, would occur even if those fixed costs of production could 
not be recovered). 
Non-economic motivations may have translated poorly to outputs when high 
costs of production and dissemination meant the production of cultural works 
required significant financial investments.  Today, however, many cultural artifacts 
can be made and disseminated for unprecedentedly little outlay, and largescale, 
high-quality cultural production is occurring independently of copyright’s 
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incentives.73  Millions of individuals contribute product reviews, Wikipedia edits, 
and Internet movie database entries without any expectation of financial reward.  
Others supply an extraordinary amount of original music and video to online 
platforms (Soundcloud alone hosts over 170 million tracks74), produce free and 
open source software,75 dedicate their photographs to the public domain,76 and 
record audio versions of public domain novels to share online.77  As Boyle muses, 
that there seems to be some “innate human love of creation that continually drives 
us to create new things even when homo economicus would be at home in bed, 
mumbling about public goods problems.”78 
Creators’ keenness to practice their crafts can lead them to accept lower prices 
for their works than they would if motivated exclusively by their economic 
interests.79  The Screen Actors’ Guild attempts to prevent its members from driving 
their own wages down to unsustainable levels by prohibiting them from taking 
work that does not comply with union minimums.  As Johnson puts it, “the only 
way actors can overcome the temptation to work for below scale is to enter into a 
group pledge to punish one another for doing so.”80  Nonetheless, creators regularly 
exhibit willingness to supply creative labor for lower wages than other forms of 
labor.81  And, as Towse explains, “[f]irms in the creative industries are able to 
‘free-ride’ on the willingness of artists to create and the structure of artists’ labor 
markets, characterized by short term working practices and oversupply, mak[ing] it 
hard for artists to appropriate rewards.”82  The desirability of creative work also 
tends to put creators in poor bargaining positions in their dealings with investors 
and intermediaries, which can lead them to transfer a great deal of the rewards of 
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their creative labors to others.83  Rather than limit themselves to securing the 
minimum they need to justify their investment, investors very often take everything 
they can get.  For example, in the book industry, publishers typically require 
authors to assign exclusive rights for the entire term of copyright—even as they 
sub-license rights to publishers in other territories for much shorter terms.84  Since 
at least 1919, the standard language in contracts between U.S. music publishers and 
songwriters has commonly delivered the benefit of any and all future term 
extensions to investors, funneling them away from creators.85  Even influential and 
famous composers have sometimes been forced by their publishers into sharing 
authorship credit and royalties.86  The data show that the “vast majority” of 
musicians make little from their copyrights and performers rights, with the lion’s 
share going instead to intermediaries and a small minority of stars in more powerful 
bargaining positions.87  Similar dynamics apply in Hollywood, where standard 
form contracts routinely require artists to sign over their rights not just within the 
realm of planet earth, but throughout the universe at large.88  These dynamics of 
cultural labor markets mean that what publishers take from authors can be largely 
divorced from both the cost of their investment and the work’s ultimate commercial 
value (typically largely unknown at the time of transfer). 
These realities are not new.  Indeed, they have been known at least as far back as 
1737.  At that time, recognizing that the true worth of books is often unknown until 
well after publication, and that authors may, out of necessity, sell their entire rights 
to investors, British legislation proposed limiting transfers to a maximum of ten 
years, followed by reversion to authors.89  That proposal was never enacted, but 
almost 250 years later the House Report for the (ultimately enacted) U.S. 
termination right focused similarly on the “impossibility of determining a work’s 
value until it has been exploited,” as did the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
those provisions soon after they came into operation.90 
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Figure 1: the opening page of the 1737 draft legislation.  Image credit: L. 
Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., An Act for the Encouragement of Learning 
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There are of course certain “floors” to what publishers can or will offer even in 
the absence of statutory limits on what authors can transfer.  These may exist as 
part of copyright law (such as mandated minimum remuneration rights for authors), 
general law (for example, prohibitions on “unconscionable” contracts), as a matter 
of competition (where the offered amount is so low that a rational competitor 
would outbid it) or morality (where publishers are “shamed” for paying below a 
certain level).  Warner Brothers apparently responded to this latter motivation after 
the media began bringing attention to the plight of the creators of “Superman,” 
decades after they sold the comic strip and character outright for $130.  While their 
creation was still generating hundreds of millions of dollars for others, the men 
were entering their old age virtually destitute.  Describing itself as under a “moral 
obligation,” Warner Brothers agreed—almost forty years after the initial grant—to 
provide Superman’s first creators with health insurance, a modest annual annuity, 
and attribution.91  However, these floors set a low bar, and rarely prevent authors 
from being required to hand over the lion’s share of their economic interest as a 
condition of investment or distribution in the first place.  
Ricketson has argued that, since so many copyrights tend to be transferred to 
intermediaries, copyright duration “become[s] of secondary importance” to 
authors.92  Where investors hold the rights, he suggests that the relevant question 
becomes:  “What length of protection is necessary to ensure the continuance of 
investment?”93  In an environment where rights are routinely extracted, authors’ 
interests might be better protected by “appropriate safeguards for the licensing and 
assignment of their rights” than by longer terms.94  Certainly we can see that longer 
terms, without steps to secure them to authors, do little to direct rewards to their 
proper pockets.95 
II. COPYRIGHT’S OUTDATED ASSUMPTIONS 
When evaluated against its fundamental aims, copyright comes into focus as a 
bad deal.  I have argued that current approaches award far more than what is 
necessary to incentivize even the biggest investments—and they do so in a way that 
is actively counter-productive to the underlying access aims those incentives are 
intended to promote.  At the same time, they see much of the benefit of copyright’s 
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rewards component, justifiable only for authors themselves, being diverted to 
investors instead. 
As foreshadowed in this paper’s Introduction, I argue that this situation has 
come about, in large part, because many of copyright’s underlying assumptions no 
longer hold good.  Below, I identify and explain the most significant of these failed 
premises.  Updated versions are then proposed to better reflect current socio-
technological realities, and form the basis for the alternative bargain that follows. 
A. FAILED PREMISES 
1. There Is No Downside To the Grant of Terms That Will Almost Certainly 
Outlast Their Owner’s Interest, Because Most Works Will Be Quickly Lost 
Regardless 
Explicit evidence of this assumption can be found in Samuel Clemens’ 1906 
testimony to the U.S. Congress.96  Advocating for longer terms, he pointed out 
there is “only one book in 1000 that can outlive the [existing] forty-two-year limit.”  
When copyrights expired, those few valuable books continued to be published, and 
the valueless continued not to be:  the only difference lay in whether publishers 
were obliged to continue sharing their profits with authors or their heirs.  Thus, 
Clemens argued, lawmakers might as well grant long terms to every single work.  
That would enable authors to share in the benefits of those few that proved of 
lasting value—the rest would be lost to obscurity regardless.  
At that time, he was correct:  high marginal costs of copying and distribution 
indeed meant that only the most popular and valuable works could be made 
enduringly available.  This might help explain why the development of 
international norms governing duration has been, as Ricketson puts it, “notable for 
an almost complete absence of debate of the policy and theoretical issues 
involved.”97  The assumption that there was no downside then in giving long terms 
to all works still held good in 1948, when the Brussels Act of the Berne Convention 
first mandated minimum terms (for most works) of author’s life plus fifty years.  
And indeed, most participants in the copyright ecosystem undoubtedly still 
understood it to work that way in 1994, when those minimums were baked into 
(and made meaningfully enforceable by) TRIPS.  Almost immediately after, 
however, the popularisation of the Internet and digital technologies drove the 
marginal cost of copying and global distribution, for many kinds of works, to 
virtually nothing.  That means most works now don’t have to be lost—and that 
there are real costs imposed by the automatic grant of long terms regardless of 
whether their owners want them, need them or even know they exist.  The problem 
is worse for some works than others, with a 2010 report for the European 
 
 96. A Bill to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearing on S. 6330 and 
H.R. 19853 Before the H. and S. Comms. on Patents, 59th Cong. (1906) (statement of Samuel L. 
Clemens [Mark Twain]), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW & THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 286-89 
(James Boyle & Jennifer Jenkins eds., 3d ed. 2016). 
 97. Ricketson, supra note 21, at 777. 
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Commission reporting that ninety percent of the photographs held in UK museums 
were orphaned.98  Even books, typically emblazoned with the names of both author 
and publisher, were “conservatively” estimated to be orphaned at a rate of thirteen 
percent.99  Where works’ owners can be found at all, cultural institutions can spend 
up to fifty times the cost of digitisation tracking down works’ owners.100  Neglected 
copyrights are causing works to languish, unexploited, even when investors want to 
publish them and authors and readers want them read. 
2. If Copyright Is Granted, Access Will Follow 
Copyright’s instrumentalist aims are not intended to incentivize creation as an 
aim in and of itself, but so that societies can benefit from widespread access to 
knowledge and culture.  However, copyright owners have no positive obligations to 
make works available in order to obtain any part of that protection.  Instead, the 
approach entrenched in Berne and TRIPS—for rights to be paid in full, upfront—
seems premised on the idea that, if a work is awarded copyright, access will follow.  
As we see from the scale of the orphan works and availability problems already 
discussed, we can no longer rely on this to happen.101  In large part, the reasons 
identified immediately above apply to explain the failure of this assumption too:  
reduced costs of copying and distribution mean it is feasible to make far more 
works enduringly available than was the case in the past, but that does not mean 
that copyright owners themselves will be interested in being the ones to do so.  
Reductions in the costs of initial production for many kinds of work might also 
disrupt this assumption:  after all, if a work costs less to make, it follows that the 
commercial imperative to exploit lessens also.102 
Additionally, however, the failure of this assumption can be attributed to the 
explosion in the range of business models available to creators and cultural 
investors.  Consider this change as it relates to book distribution.  In 1971, when 
Berne was last revised, an author feasibly had just one way of making her work 
available to the public:  print publication via a publisher.  High marginal costs of 
copying, storage and distribution meant that works could remain in print only for as 
long as they continued to sell in sufficient numbers (or the author or investor were 
willing to subsidize their production).  Today there are myriad alternatives to that 
model, including any combination of print-on-demand, digital sale, digital 
subscription and library licensing.  Self-publishing, via services such as 
 
 98. VUOPALA, supra note 60, at 29 (citing GOWERS, supra note 30).  
 99. Id. at 19.  This data was sourced from the Society of College, National and University 
Libraries and was current as of Jan. 2010.  The methodology for calculating this figure is set out in the 
report. 
 100. Id. at 24.  This data was sourced from the University of Innsbruck Library, Austria, as of 
December 2009. 
 101. See supra notes 44, 48-56 and accompanying text. 
 102. See, e.g., GIBLIN, CODE WARS, supra note 1, at 142-45. 
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Smashwords, Amazon or Apple iBooks, is also increasingly viable:  by 2015, about 
one third of the bestselling ebooks on Amazon were self-published.103 
The availability of this new multitude of options is significant.  The mere fact 
one party holds the rights for a work does not mean that they will have the interest 
or capacity to fully exploit them in all the formats and markets where they have (or 
develop) value.  As developed in Thompson’s empirical analysis of the U.S. and 
U.K. trade book industries, investors may have rational reasons for forsaking such 
opportunities.  In work built from years of insider interviews, Thompson describes 
how the main trade publishing houses achieved growth amidst flat sales by 
reducing staff and cutting costs.  Rather than investing in more titles, the aim was 
to consolidate, and then maximize profit by selling more copies of a smaller 
number.  Those tactics saw sales forces reduced and increasingly overstretched, to 
the point where insiders reported being able to provide support to only about 
twenty-five percent of new titles published.104  Not surprisingly, those practices 
resulted in heavy field polarization, whereby bestselling titles came to sell more 
copies than ever but those in the range of ten thousand to fifty thousand paperbacks 
declined significantly.105  In such consolidated markets, investors may rationally 
avoid exploiting the full range of possible uses, to reduce costs and avoid splitting 
the revenues they might obtain from mega sellers.  While such strategies may 
further investors’ immediate interests, they do not ideally promote society’s interest 
in access. 
This century’s explosion of new business models provides another lesson too.  
Under Berne/TRIPS, copyright in works must last at least the author’s lifetime plus 
fifty years.  Such time horizons can usher in enormous changes.  Just because an 
investor was best placed to exploit a particular work at one point in time, that’s not 
to say she still will be decades later.  If copyright is to be an effective tool for 
promoting access, it needs better mechanisms for freeing up rights to new uses as 
circumstances change.   
3. Copyright Will Get Authors Paid  
This assumption differs from the others in that it’s perhaps arguable it has never 
really held good:  as we saw from the 1737 draft legislation referenced above, 
recognition of authors being unfairly extracted of their copyrights has existed for 
almost as long as copyright itself.  Be that as it may, the idea that it gets authors 
paid it is a core article of faith in support of copyright.  Today however that faith is 
being tested as never before—particularly for professional writers, who in recent 
years have suffered truly precipitous declines in income.106  
 
 103. See Alexandra Alter, Meredith Wild, a Self-Publisher Making an Imprint, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
30, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2ktrlcp. 
 104. JOHN THOMPSON, MERCHANTS OF CULTURE: THE PUBLISHING BUSINESS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 189-90 (2d ed., 2012). 
 105. Id. at 389-91. 
 106. See THE AUTHORS GUILD, THE WAGES OF WRITING 4-5 (2015), https://perma.cc/BPE6-9B69 
(U.S.); THE AUTHORS’ LICENSING AND COLLECTING SOCIETY, WHAT ARE WORDS WORTH NOW? 
FURTHER FINDINGS 4-5 (2017), https://perma.cc/8V46-ZC79 (U.K.); JAN ZWAR ET AL., AUSTRALIAN 
GIBLIN, RECLAIMING LOST CULTURE AND GETTING AUTHORS PAID, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 369 (2018) 
390 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [41:3 
There are numerous explanations for this, including the field consolidation and 
polarization so masterfully chronicled by Thompson.107  One other of particular 
(and under-recognized) import concerns the increasing divergence of authors’ and 
publishers’ interests.  Once again, the trade book industry usefully illustrates.  
Publishers typically take exclusive rights for the entire term of copyright.  Before 
digital, this was not so problematic:  after all, there were no realistic options for 
keeping a book available once sales fell below a certain feasibility threshold, 
regardless of who controlled the rights, and that meant the author’s interest and the 
publisher’s interest had some significant degree of alignment.  Now that decreases 
in the marginal cost of distributed copying have generated so many more options, 
however, it may not be in the author’s interest for one publisher to hold exclusive 
rights ongoing.  As a result, contract duration has become an increasingly urgent 
priority for authors’ organizations worldwide.108  
To get a sense of how authors’ and publishers’ interests can diverge over time, it 
is useful to look to the terms which publishers offer public libraries older books for 
digital lending.  Figure 2 lists winners of the Pulitzer Prize for fiction for ten years 
starting in 1982 (i.e., twenty-five years ago at time of writing), the current price of 
a paperback edition, and the price and licence terms on which it is purchasable by 
U.S. and Australian public libraries. Figure 3 shows the same data for the four 
winners from 2013-2016 (there was no prize awarded in 2012) to provide contrast 















AUTHORS: INDUSTRY BRIEF NO. 3: AUTHORS’ INCOME 2 (2015), https://perma.cc/HTT5-ZAE7 
(Australia).  
 107. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text. 
 108. See, e.g., Society of Authors, An Open Letter to Members of the Publishers Association & the 
Independent Publishers Guild (Jan. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/G98Q-8KLH (emphasizing contract 
duration under “T” term of “CREATOR” principles).  This letter was part of a broad international push 
to seek reform in contractual terms.  See Alison Flood, Philip Pullman: Professional Writers Set to 
Become “an Endangered Species”, GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/JS78-2844.  See also 
AUTHORS GUILD, supra note 84. 
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This is a tiny sample, but nonetheless provides some useful insights.  Notably, 
twenty percent of the older Pulitzer-winning books are not available to U.S. 
libraries and thirty percent are not available to Australian ones on any terms at all.  
For those that are available, the data show that the terms offered to U.S. and 
Australian libraries vary significantly.  U.S. libraries tend to be offered “OC/OU” 
(“one copy, one user”) licences, which permit them to hold the books on a 
perpetual basis, for lending to one user at a time, in exchange for a higher upfront 
payment.  Australian libraries typically pay less up front in exchange for more 
limited “metered access” licences, which limit the number of checkouts and/or time 
the title can be held within the collection.  Thus, a U.S. library can license Updike’s 
classic Rabbit at Rest for $48, and lend it out to one user at a time indefinitely, 
while an Australian library can purchase it for $22 (i.e. twice the paperback price) 
and it will be deleted from its collection in two years or after thirty-six checkouts, 
whichever comes first.  Interestingly, there seems to be little attempt at 
discriminating between titles on price:  of the five available titles published by 
Penguin Random House, four are offered to U.S. libraries for $48, and one for $51.  
The single Penguin Random House title in the “recent” prize list is also set at $51.  
The lack of price differentiation between newer and older titles might surprise, 
given that we know (given high rates of depreciation on the trade book industry) 
that older books are not a good substitute for new ones. 
Obviously, such pricing and licencing strategies influence which books libraries 
add to their collections.  High upfront prices and “exploding” licences (which see 
books deleted from collections even if never borrowed) can both act as deterrents to 
purchase, particularly for older books that are likely to have relatively low demand.  
However, the strategies make sense when you realise that publishers are generally 
interested in maximizing their overall share of library collection budgets, rather 
than in maximising the income of any individual author.  They are also not 
necessarily interested in any individual book continuing to be read, which may well 
be part of an author’s interest.  It is probably quite rational for publishers to price 
their back catalogue highly, knowing that fewer books will be sold, but overall 
profits will be larger.  However, those strategies can mean less income for 
individual authors than they might otherwise have had.  That’s problematic, when 
we recollect that for titles that are twenty-five years old and more, the continued 
existence of copyright is justifiable overwhelmingly as being about rewards for 
authors.  
We see divergence in authors’ and publishers’ interests earlier too.  Recall 
Thompson’s study into the U.K. and U.S. trade book industries, in which he found 
that the industry “consolidation” that enabled it to achieve growth in an era of flat 
sales left it unable to provide sales support to more than about one-quarter of titles 
on release.  The interest of those publishers is in selling as many copies as possible 
with the smallest overheads, and that has driven development of an increasingly 
polarized field featuring a few mega-sellers and far fewer midrange books than was 
the case in the past.109  In such a market, it makes sense that investors might 
 
 109. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text. 
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rationally decline to pursue other potential revenue streams, particularly those that 
might not individually generate much income (or which might potentially eat into 
the sales of those mega books).  But again, those potential revenues are likely to be 
much more significant to individual authors, particularly in this era of declining 
incomes.  
Research from the British Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society recently 
found that seventy percent of authors who reclaimed their rights from publishers 
ended up earning more money from their works after reversion.110  This sample 
exhibits self-selection bias, but nonetheless it shows that leaving works in the hands 
of an initial publisher for decades won’t necessarily result in the best outcomes for 
authors.  If we really want authors to get paid, consideration needs to be given to 
ways of freeing up rights for future exploitations that might not be maximally 
valued by the initial investor. 
4. Registration Requirements Are Costly and Onerous To Authors 
Registration requirements certainly were expensive and often unfair in 1908, 
when the Berlin Act first prohibited formalities on the exercise and enjoyment of 
rights—and even in 1994 when TRIPS was agreed (and when less than half a 
percent of the world’s population yet had access to the Internet).111  Today of 
course registration online has become so rapid and cheap to be an unremarked 
feature of daily life (at least in developed nations).  At last count, I had personally 
registered for around five hundred different websites and apps.  Currently, 
registrations exist for over three hundred and thirty million top level domain 
names.112  Digital-era copyright registration would be a very different beast to that 
which prevailed when the first Model Ts were rolling off Ford’s production line, 
with potential not only to increase revenues by connecting copyright owners to 
potential licensees, but also, as discussed below, to help better secure to authors 
their share.    
5. Departing from Berne’s Minima Is Definitionally Worse for Authors 
Berne is only intended to regulate members’ treatment of other members’ 
nationals.  Thus, states are expressly permitted to depart from Berne minima with 
regard to works “first published” within their borders.113  This principle of 
independence of protection is one of the three “basic principles” on which Berne is 
based.114 
 
 110. See THE AUTHORS’ LICENSING AND COLLECTING SOCIETY, supra note 106, at 9. 
 111. See Julia Murphy & Max Roser, Internet, OUR WORLD IN DATA § I.1 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/7GMQ-7AXG. 
 112. See VERISIGN, THE DOMAIN NAME INDUSTRY BRIEF 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/FA6J-D545.  
 113. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5, Sept. 9, 1886, 
as revised July 24, 1971, and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 
https://perma.cc/A8MA-9CGV. 
 114. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, Summary of the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), https://perma.cc/TJ6K-UE3Q. 
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Despite that, it is assumed that Berne’s standards are definitionally more 
advantageous to authors, and thus that nations would rarely (if ever) choose to 
depart from them.  For example, Ginsburg writes:  “Although neither [Berne nor 
TRIPS] prescribes the level of protection a member State must afford authors 
whose works were first published in that State, most countries, wary of treating 
their own authors worse than foreign authors, end up incorporating the 
international norms in to domestic legislation.”115  
It remains the case that nations are, for good reason, wary of giving their own 
authors less preferential treatment.  However, the discussion above has shown how 
radically the costs and benefits of copyright have changed with the advent of digital 
(particularly with regard to formalities), and how poorly existing approaches secure 
rewards to authors.  Policy responses need also to change.  If we have reached a 
point where judicious use of registration could better secure to authors their share, 
as I will argue more fully below, then it is also time to challenge the orthodoxy that 
domestic Berne departure is definitionally bad for authors. 
B. WHAT ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD WE BE WORKING FROM INSTEAD? 
The copyright equation has fundamentally altered over the last century, while its 
fundamental structure has largely remained unchanged.  This helps explain why 
copyright now does such a poor job of achieving its aims.  
We have seen that copyright’s main treaties are effectively unamendable—but 
that does not mean we have to keep regulating everything exactly the same way as 
we have in the past.  A better approach would be to update our assumptions about 
copyright’s costs and benefits, identify what we want to achieve, and then seek out 
a pathway through the treaty framework that will get us closest to being able to 
achieve those aims.  So what might updated assumptions look like? 
1. Most works can be made enduringly available in some form or another, even 
if not necessarily via the same distribution model which first took them to 
market. 
2. While maintaining investment incentives, rights need to be regularly “freed 
up” to facilitate use by those willing to make the desired investments in 
availability and access.  
3. Formalities can be cheap and easy, at least in developed countries. They 
shouldn’t be ruled out just because they might require domestic departure 
from Berne minima, particularly if that would help secure a bigger share 
to authors. 
4. The interests of authors and investors are different. Rights should be 
allocated so as to properly satisfy society’s incentives and rewards 
motivations.  
In the following section I use these updated assumptions as a guide to navigating 
the international treaty framework and sketching out an alternative copyright 
 
 115. Jane C. Ginsburg, Contracts, Orphan Works, and Copyright Norms: What Role for Berne and 
TRIPS?, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 471, 483 (Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010). 
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bargain achievable within its contours.  It shows that, although the treaties do 
impose certain “immovable obstacles,” they nonetheless leave scope for 
meaningful reform that could reconceptualize parties’ rights and responsibilities, 
reflect current social and technical realities, and bring about a copyright bargain 
that better achieves its aims.116 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE BARGAIN:  NAVIGATING COPYRIGHT’S 
INTERNATIONAL TREATY FRAMEWORK TO BETTER ACHIEVE 
ITS AIMS 
What could an alternative bargain, built on assumptions that better reflect the 
realities of the world we live in, while remaining within existing treaty texts, 
actually look like? 
A. AUTOMATIC REVERSION TO AUTHORS 
We have seen that, after about twenty-five years, copyright’s initial incentive 
rationales are satisfied, with the remainder of the term overwhelmingly justified as 
an additional reward for authors.  We have seen also that current approaches see 
that rewards component being too-often captured by investors.  Given all we know 
about cultural labor markets, one way of better securing authors their share would 
be to limit what they can give away in the first place.  What if authors could only 
assign or exclusively license rights for a maximum of twenty-five years, after 
which the rights would automatically revert back to them in full? 
There are no treaty obstacles to such an approach, as Berne and TRIPS are silent 
as to ownership of rights.  Indeed, Canadian law already automatically reverts 
works to heirs twenty-five years after the author’s death,117 and U.S. law permits 
authors or their heirs to reclaim rights in most works thirty-five years after grant.118 
The legal literature around reversionary rights has sometimes hypothesized, 
though so far without empirical substantiation, that reversionary arrangements must 
result in authors receiving lower upfront payments.119  That would be a problematic 
result given that creative incomes already tend to be very low,120 and that, relative 
to investors, authors tend to be more risk averse, having shorter time horizons for 
recouping their investments.121  However, economists Karas and Kirstein have 
 
 116. Elsewhere, I have led a similar reimagination exercise unconstrained by these treaties.  See 
generally Giblin & Weatherall, supra note 6. 
 117. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, § 14(1) (Can.). 
 118. See 17 U.S.C. § 203.  These rules apply to grants made on or after Jan. 1, 1978.  Slightly 
different termination rules apply to works pre-dating the 1978 Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 304. 
 119. See e.g., Guy A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in 
Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 97-98 (2013); Kate Darling, Occupy Copyright: A Law & 
Economic Analysis of U.S. Author Termination Rights, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 165-66 (2015); Amy 
Gilbert, Note, The Time Has Come: A Proposed Revision to 17 U.S.C. § 203, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
807, 810 (2016).   
 120. See, e.g., TOWSE, supra note 81; Throsby & Thompson, supra note 81.  See also supra note 
106 (detailing declines in author salaries). 
 121. Darling, supra note 119, at 164. 
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recently questioned assumptions that termination drives down initial prices.  After 
modelling the U.S. termination law, they found that, rather than making contracts 
riskier for authors, termination contracts can actually reduce the risk: 
if . . . the present value of royalty earnings avoided through a termination decision is 
smaller than the present value of termination revenue streams, we have the contrary 
effect, and the amount of risk in termination contracts decreases.  In other words, the 
termination right would not necessarily force authors into lotteries, at least no more so 
than in the conventional copyright systems.122 
It makes sense that a reversionary term around twenty-five years would have 
little (if any) downward effect on prices.123  After all, the present value of those 
later years of copyright protection is zero or virtually zero at the time of 
contracting, so the existence of a reversionary right should also make zero or 
virtually zero difference to the amount paid upfront.  Where reversionary rights 
currently operate (e.g., after thirty-five years in the US, or twenty-five years after 
the author’s death in Canada), I have been unable to locate any data suggesting that 
those authors receive less than counterparts in equivalent jurisdictions.  
Significantly also, in considering whether there is likely to be any impact, it’s 
important to remember that cultural labor markets do not operate in the ordinary 
fashion.  As we have seen, practitioners exhibit willingness to provide creative 
labor for far lower rates than other forms of labor,124 making art, as Doctorow puts 
it, “an irrational market.”125  In cases where prices paid to authors are already 
divorced from the value of their labor, and bearing in mind that longer than that the 
value beyond twenty-five years would be virtually zero at the time of contracting, 
that length of reversionary term ought not have downward impact on prices.  If 
however opportunistic investors were to threaten to use that as excuse to further 
reduce payments to authors, then that could be countered by regulation securing 
unwaivable minimums to authors, drawing inspiration from one or more of the 
continental European countries that already have them in place.126 
 
 122. Michael Karas & Roland Kirstein, Efficient Contracting Under the U.S. Copyright 
Termination Law, INT’L REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7) (authors’ corrected 
proof available at https://perma.cc/67B3-2GAK). 
 123. Cf. Kretschmer, supra note 35, at 46 (proposal for ten-year reversionary terms).  Given the 
same discount and cultural depreciation rates as used here, that could indeed be expected to sometimes 
have a downward impact on initial prices paid (though it may also ultimately result in higher earnings in 
many cases).  Such proposals for short reversionary terms are worthy of much fuller experimentation 
and modelling to better understand likely overall impacts.  I note that the Canelo digital publishing 
company requires that authors grant exclusive licenses of only five years, in exchange for royalties of at 
least fifty percent, demonstrating that some forms of publishing require investments that can be 
recouped on very short time horizons.  See CANELO, supra note 37.   
 124. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 125. Cory Doctorow, The Point of Patreon Isn’t How Many People Earn a Full-Time Living, It’s 
How Much of the Money from Art Goes to Artists, BOING BOING (Dec. 8, 2017, 10:54 AM), 
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 126. These systems are broadly outlined and evaluated in SÉVERINE DUSOLLIER ET AL., EUR. 
PARLIAMENT DIR. GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS APPLICABLE TO 
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To prevent subversion, authors would also need to be protected against attempts 
to extract all future twenty-five year blocks “upfront,” i.e., agreements to transfer 
rights in advance would need to be void.  Otherwise, we would end up with the 
same problem as with previous reversionary systems, which saw publishers too 
often taking all they could get.127 
It would also be necessary to avoid situations where investors were 
disincentivized from further investment by a too-short remaining period of 
protection.  For example, imagine a book author who enters a contract with a 
publisher to publish the book, granting exclusive rights to reproduce the text for 
twenty-five years and reserving the film rights.  In the twenty-fourth year of the 
publication contract, a film adaptation is released.  This would be a great 
opportunity to re-market the book, but the publisher may be reluctant to make those 
investments knowing that their exclusivity period was about to lapse.128  While the 
author would be restricted from granting more than twenty-five years exclusivity at 
any time, there is no reason why the author and publisher should not be able to 
mutually agree to terminate the previous grant and enter into a fresh one for a new 
period of up to another twenty-five years—this time each with much better 
knowledge of what the work is worth. 
B. WHAT COULD WE GAIN? 
With such measures in place however, such a system suggests intriguing 
possibilities—not only for improving authors’ remuneration, but for achieving 
copyright’s access aims as well. 
Upon expiry of that initial grant, authors could re-exploit in any way they 
wished, including by assigning it back to the same intermediary for up to another 
twenty-five years.  As we have seen, the vast majority of most works’ commercial 
value tends to be extracted very soon after publication.129  In the case of books, that 
can be within just a single year.130  Those realities might make it infeasible for the 
work to continue being distributed ongoing via print publication or distributed 
through book stores.131  However, as the Authors Guild has argued, reversion after 
relatively brief terms can provide welcome flexibility for both writers and 
investors, as well as open up possibilities for alternative exploitations: 
When the contract expires, if a book is still doing well, the author and publisher might 
negotiate another time-limited deal—or the author might choose to move the book to 
 
 127. See generally Lionel E.F. Bently & Jane C. Ginsburg, “The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the 
Authors”: Anglo-American Authors’ Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. 
Copyright, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475 (2010); Patry, supra note 68, at 916–18 (discussing U.K. and 
U.S. reversionary laws).  Note also that the draft English legislation, dated 1737, also included such a 
protection.  See supra note 89. 
 128. See Ruth Towse, Copyright Reversion in The Creative Industries:  Economics and Fair 
Remuneration, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2018) (in this volume).  
 129. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.  
 130. GOWERS, supra note 30, at 52. 
 131. See JOHN THOMPSON, supra note 104, at 283–91 (describing the shortening shelf life of 
books, and accelerating speed with which physical copies are remaindered by retailers).   
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a house that has put more effort into marketing the author’s later works.  If the book is 
no longer gaining support from the original publisher, the author might choose to self-
publish it or take it to another publisher.  In any case, a time-limited contract gives 
authors the leverage and flexibility that they need in today’s publishing 
environment.132  
Wholesale reversion could also encourage emergence of new markets for older 
books that are unfeasible under current arrangements.  Consider the possibilities 
around direct licensing by authors of their older works for elending in libraries.  
Currently, publishers (rather than authors) are overwhelmingly the ones who sell 
books into libraries for elending.  That makes sense since publishers typically take 
distribution rights for entire terms, leaving very few “published” book authors with 
the rights to authorise this kind of use.  We saw above that investors can exploit 
these rights in such a way as to maximise their overall share of library collections 
budgets, rather than maximise revenues for any given author.  As discussed above, 
authors can sometimes regain their rights by triggering contractual reversion 
clauses where their books have gone “out of print.”133  However, even where a 
book does satisfy that (increasingly outdated) notion, this requires authors to 
understand their rights, take positive action to assert them, and then seek out a new 
distributor.  These barriers help explain why there are not yet any widespread direct 
licensing models directly between authors and ebook lending aggregators and/or 
libraries.134 
Now imagine an environment where every book author would automatically 
regain her rights after a maximum of twenty-five years.  Suddenly it would make 
sense for services to facilitate the direct licensing of books by authors to libraries.  
And, unlike typical commercial publication contracts, which allocates just ten to 
twenty-five percent of ebook revenues to authors, those directly licensing their 
reverted rights would be entitled to the whole (minus a cut to the platform provider 
for providing the service and processing payments).135  Libraries could potentially 
even collaborate to provide such platforms themselves. 
The revenues that would result from such new markets may often be small for 
any given work, which is why the original publishers might rationally adopt pricing 
strategies that forsake them (particularly in consolidated markets such as that 
described by Thompson).136  However, even if they are not interesting to investors, 
they may well amount to a valuable source of income for individual authors.  Let’s 
again use that data around those Pulitzer Prize winning older novels as an example.  
An Australian library may be unable to justify paying double the paperback price 
for a licence that will see the book deleted from its collection two years later, even 
if never borrowed at all.  However, it could well be able to license the book for 
 
 132. AUTHORS GUILD, supra note 84. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Part III.D, infra for further discussion of the problems with out-of-print clauses as 
typically drafted today. 
 135. Half of Net Proceeds Is the Fair Royalty Rate for E-books, AUTHORS GUILD (July 9, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/5U9H-H2UX. 
 136. See Thompson, supra note 104. 
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equitable per loan remuneration paid directly to the author—ultimately generating 
new revenues for authors, and keeping more books read. 
C. WHAT COULD WE LOSE? THE POTENTIAL TO ORPHAN 
Since rights would be opened to the possibility of new exploitations after a 
specified period, the proposed reversionary system would also beneficially reduce 
the concentration of rights that results in oligopoly power and perpetuates authors’ 
poor remuneration outcomes.  However, we would need to be very careful to 
ensure that it would not actually worsen the problem of orphaned or neglected 
works.  Automatic reversion could potentially result in people ending up with rights 
without even realising, or perhaps direct them to individuals who have no interest 
in further exploitation.  Thus, if an automatic reversion system were to be effective 
in achieving its aims, it would need also to be supported by an ownership registry 
to facilitate rights clearance.  Berne and TRIPS prohibit formalities imposed on the 
“enjoyment and exercise” of treaty rights.137  However, formalities on ownership 
transfers are permitted.138  That means nations could validly require registration of 
transfers and other grants of exclusive rights.  An appropriately low-cost online 
registration system would not be onerous given that most jurisdictions already 
require transfers and exclusive licenses to be evidenced in writing.  And, if 
attempted transfers were to be void unless they are registered by the assignee, that 
would strongly incentivise compliance. 
But that would still not entirely solve the potential for orphaning.  Such a 
registry could be up to twenty-five years out of date by the time rights reverted.  
Although authors could be encouraged to keep their details up to date, there’s still a 
risk that they might not be locatable—or that they would have no further interest in 
exploiting their reverted works.  And it would be of no assistance at all for that vast 
majority of rights in works which fall outside our Berne-permissible registry power 
since they have never been transferred.   
D. MIGHT ONE PROBLEM SOLVE THE OTHER? 
Those works—artefacts such as local maps, photographs of towns over time, 
ephemera like concert tickets and protest posters and even self-published books—
are at the heart of copyright’s collective action problem.  They all attract copyright, 
but the overwhelming majority of them are not individually valuable enough to 
their owners to be worth exploiting.  Collectively, however, the lost value to 
society from copyrights that outlast their owners’ interest is enormous.  
Let us step back for a moment.  Throughout this paper I have been arguing that 
current approaches to copyright suffer from two core problems.  First, despite 
 
 137. Berne Convention, supra note 113, art. 5(2); Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 
9(1). 
 138. See Jane C. Ginsburg, “With Untired Spirits and Formal Constancy”: Berne Compatibility of 
Formal Declaratory Measures to Enhance Copyright Title Searching, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1583, 
1611–22 (2013). 
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having put authors at the forefront of expansionary rhetoric for generations, 
copyright can’t seem to find a way of actually getting them paid.  Second, despite 
(or perhaps because of) ever broader and longer rights, current approaches to 
copyright are very often causing the loss of cultural value.  In other words, there’s 
not enough money, and too much money being left on the table.  This juxtaposition 
is suggestive.  Might the one problem help solve the other? 
This framing evokes Victor Hugo’s idea of a domaine public payant, most 
famously enunciated in his speech of 1878.  At that time, the French droit d’auteur 
already granted rights that extended past the author’s lifetime.139  When rights 
expired, publishers continued not publishing the valueless books, and printing the 
still valuable ones—the only real difference was that they had no obligation to 
continue sharing the revenues with authors’ heirs.  Hugo argued that they should 
not be entitled to the whole of the pie, and that, instead, investors should have some 
continuing obligation to pay to print those works.  Suggestively, his concern was 
not with authors’ “heirs of the blood” (at least not beyond a single generation).  
Instead, he proposed that most revenues from exploitation of out-of-copyright texts 
should go to authors’ “heirs of the spirit”—new generations of writers who needed 
support to write and get established.140  They, in turn, would nourish future 
generations of writers. 
The problem we confront today is much the same:  What should we do with 
still-valuable works in which their authors no longer have an interest?  One option 
might be to introduce, not a paid public domain, but an “author’s domain.”  Works 
in the author’s domain could be appropriately exploited by a cultural steward, with 
the resulting proceeds used to directly support authorship through the provision of 
prizes, grants and fellowships.  Such a steward could have the dual mission of 
generating revenues while also promoting widespread availability and access.  Such 
a system could help get creators paid by reclaiming lost cultural value—furthering 
both copyright’s incentives and rewards aims while directly supporting production 
of new works to boot. 
Any such system would seem doomed to fall foul of Berne, since distinguishing 
between still-interested and no-longer-interested authors would seem to inevitably 
require some form of registration, contravening the blanket prohibition on 
formalities on exercise and enjoyment of rights (to say nothing of the potential 
additional violations of limits on exceptions and compulsory licensing).  But if such 
measures could further copyright’s incentives and rewards aims, improving 
remuneration outcomes for authors and access for broader society, Berne’s 
obstacles take on a different character.  As discussed above, members have no 
obligation to apply Berne to works first published within their borders.  It has long 
been assumed that departing from Berne is definitionally worse for authors, and 
thus that countries would rarely wish to do so:  treating local authors worse than 
foreign ones has terrible political optics.  However, this analysis shows that we 
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have reached a point where this assumption too does not necessarily hold good.  
Introducing an “author’s domain” to reclaim some of the value from abandoned 
works (being those where the author has not taken minimal steps to indicate her 
continuing interest) and invest it into direct support of authorship requires elements 
of domestic Berne departure—but in ways that advance authors’ interests more 
strongly than current arrangements. 
Appropriate governance structures would of course be vital to the success of any 
such system.  Particular care would need to be taken to ensure that an “author’s 
domain” does not give (and is not perceived as giving) the state too much control 
over culture.141  Cultural differences and existing organizational infrastructure 
would play a big role in determining how appropriate governance would be 
achieved in different nations, but it would seem necessary to separate revenue 
collection from revenue allocation, and perhaps task specialist cultural bodies in 
various artistic fields with the job of determining recipients (upon appropriately 
transparent application of specified criteria).  In setting up these structures, lessons 
could be learnt from the experience of existing “paid public domains,” which, 
inspired by the Hugoian ideal, already operate in a number of nations.  Myriad 
variants exist:  some require payments to be made in perpetuity while others are 
limited in time; some attract remuneration for commercial uses only; fees can be 
flat percentages of revenue, lump sums, or determined by an independent body; 
some apply only to certain classes of works.  Rights may be controlled by the state, 
authors’ societies or unions.  Some require prior permission, while others allow any 
use upon payment of a fee.142  It is possible to achieve many of the social and 
cultural advantages sought by paid public domains while minimising their 
detriments.  For example, if it captured only those works in which authors had not 
indicated further interest, it would directly support authorship in a way that 
facilitated public use.  And, if it operated only until the cessation of copyright, it 
would not interfere with the vibrancy of the public domain.  That was not a 
consideration when most paid public domains were created, but is today, now that 
low marginal costs of copying and distribution make it feasible to enjoy and build 
 
 141. That fear led to the derailment of the German “paid public domain” proposal in 1965.  See 
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on more of those works than ever before.  Infrastructure is critical, too:  the system 
relies upon more-or-less universal access to low-cost registration processes, making 
it feasible only in the most developed nations. 
To achieve their aims, it seems clear that the two core elements of the alternative 
bargain I propose—reversion to authors and transfer of abandoned works to an  
'author’s domain'—would need to have automatic operation.  Automatic reversion 
is not a novel idea—take, for example, the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911, which 
throughout the British Empire saw works returned to authors’ heirs twenty-five 
years after death.143  From those origins, the current Canadian Copyright Act still 
provides for automatic reversion in similar terms.144  A system of automatic 
reversion (to operate after twenty-five years) was also seriously proposed by the 
US Copyright Office in its 1963 draft Bill, although the proposal was eventually 
abandoned in favour of the current US termination right.145  Automatic reversion 
has real advantages compared to the optionally invokable, use-it-or-lose-it version 
that was eventually adopted in the US.  That right must be triggered by the author 
or heirs, and requires compliance with highly complex (and often unclear) notice 
procedures.146  As a result, exercise is worth it only for that tiny proportion of 
works whose expected remaining commercial revenues outweigh the costs.  Thus, 
it does little to help authors or broader society recapture that vast majority of works 
which no longer have that much value.  But those are precisely the works which lie 
at the heart of copyright’s collective action problem, and which could most benefit 
from rights being freed up for new investment and use.  Similarly, it is the authors 
whose works have enjoyed less commercial success that are likely to benefit most 
from even modest new revenues flowing from recapture of their rights. 
Automatic reversion would also avoid some of the problems currently plaguing 
contractual termination clauses.  Typically, such clauses grant authors reversion 
rights where a book goes out of print.  However, as the Authors Guild points out, 
they are often no longer working as intended: 
[P]ublishers have cleverly managed to craft “out of print” clauses that make it almost 
impossible for authors to recapture their rights.  Classic contract language states that a 
book is not out of print as long as it is “available for sale in any edition.”  So 
publishers “release” the book in a print-on-demand or electronic edition that’s always 
available, even if few copies are actually sold.  By relying on language originally 
intended to provide a real reversionary right, a publisher can now hold onto a book 
forever even if it’s not actually doing anything with it.  That is not how “out of print” 
was supposed to work.147 
Even if this was to be fixed, by, for example, revising reversion clauses to be 
based on a dollar value of sales instead of the increasingly-inapt notion of “out of 
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print,” it still does not fix the problem caused by the onus being on authors to take 
action to reclaim their rights.  That onus means that the default is for works to 
remain locked up—particularly those that have the least commercial value (and 
thus are also the least likely to be subject of investment by publishers).  By 
contrast, automatic reversion would distribute more rights to less financially 
successful authors.  And, by delivering no-longer-wanted works directly into an 
“author’s domain,” it could generate a stream of revenues that could be used to 
support the creation of works which might not otherwise be able to be funded. 
E. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
That has been a lot of ideas—so how might the alternative bargain they depict fit 
together into a workable system?  Many variations are possible, but here I sketch 
out one possible model (depicted graphically in Figures 4 and 5).  It begins by 
describing parts of the system that would apply equally to all works, before 
stepping through elements specific to those of domestic and foreign origin.  My 
purpose is to draw new attention to the possibilities for imagining a radically 
different copyright bargain within the existing treaty framework—not to provide a 
blueprint for implementation.  Thus, I do not address practical issues of 
implementation (including cost and timing) and address potential issues such as 
holdouts only lightly.  The system has been envisaged as extending only to works 
whose authors are their first owners.148  Works “made for hire” raise perhaps even 
more troubling questions about the proper allocation of incentives and rewards, but 
this is not the forum for addressing them:  their special characteristics, particularly 
for works involving many creators’ contributions, demand independent 
consideration.  I have also deliberately chosen to focus on time-based mechanisms 
for securing rewards to authors, as being those that most clearly enable delineation 
between copyright’s rewards and incentives components.  However, authors do of 
course have claims to fair remuneration within their initial grants as well, as have 
been recognized and supported by various mechanisms in European law.149  I note 
the significant potential for such mechanisms to help secure authors further rewards 
from their copyrights (and commend them for further academic study), but they fall 
outside the scope of this paper. 
1. All Works: 
This alternative bargain would limit transfers and licenses to a maximum of 
twenty-five years, followed by automatic reversion to authors.  Authors would still 
have the right to choose to dedicate works to the public domain, and those grants, 
like now, would be permanent.  Since Creative Commons licenses essentially give 
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effect to authors’ intentions to conditionally dedicate a work to the public domain, 
they would continue to operate as now, outside the twenty-five year limit.  
Transfers and grants of exclusive rights would be void unless registered by the 
grantee, creating a new ownership database to facilitate future clearance of rights 
(and helping to locate and notify authors when reversion occurs).  Registrations 
could include not just the scope of transfer and duration, but also details of the 
original grantor and grantee, effectively generating a Berne-compatible register of 
initial creations (albeit limited to those which had been the subject of transfer).150  
Derivative works created under license prior to reversion could be treated like those 
created prior to exercise of a termination right under U.S. law—i.e. they could 
continue to be distributed but no further new adaptations made.151  Where rights 
revert to authors, there is always a possibility that one or more might “hold out” 
permission to license.  To address that, the U.S. termination law could again be 
usefully adapted.  When it was being negotiated, film companies had argued that 
exercise of rights ought to require unanimity.  The Authors League urged against 
this out of concern that it “would likely render the exercise of the right in co-
authored works unworkable.”152  Their view prevailed, and the current law 
provides that assignments of licenses signed by the majority of owners are binding 
on all.153  A similar rule, adopted here, could ameliorate the potential for hold outs.  
That, combined with the proposed author’s domain (which would enable works to 
continue to be used even where owners are non-responsive) could reasonably be 
expected to make considerably more works available than is the case under current 
practice.  Wholesale return of rights to authors would strongly support the 
emergence of new business models, including new direct licensing options.  For 
example, book authors might be given the option of directly licensing their titles to 
national digital public libraries in exchange for per loan remuneration at the point 
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Upon reversion, the proposed system asks domestic authors to register their 
continuing interest.  Since those works would already be recorded on the registry, 
this could be as simple as asking authors to click a link to indicate their desire to 
maintain their rights in full.  Registration would eventually be asked also for non-
transferred works too.  Since this is an element of domestic Berne departure there is 
no legal reason why registration could not be required very quickly (or even 
immediately) after creation.  However, as I have written elsewhere, requiring 
registration too soon can result in unfair harms to authors, and so twenty-five years 
is again proposed as the trigger point.154 
Registered works would remain the property of authors to exploit (or not) as 
they choose.  Works that remain unregistered after reversion (for transferred works) 
and twenty-five years (for all others) would enter a “domaine d’auteur” for 
appropriate exploitation by the cultural steward.  The registry would provide 
prospective licensees with certainty about ownership:  published works of twenty-
five years old or more that did not appear in the registry would be known to be 
included in the author’s domain.  Prospective licensees could then negotiate with 
the cultural steward for permission to use, with the proceeds put towards the direct 
support of authorship (in accordance with appropriate governance and transparency 
processes as outlined above).  Such a registry would significantly facilitate rights 
clearance by making it easier for buyers and sellers to connect. 
This alternative bargain assumes a robust and flexible exceptions framework 
that enables fair uses along the lines of the U.S. model (i.e. taking into account 
factors such as the character of the use, nature of the work, amount taken and 
market impact).155  After all, the fact that a cultural steward could licence 
everything in the proposed “author’s domain” is not to suggest that she ought to.  
Heeding Lemley’s warning that the full internalisation of a work’s positive 
externalities may not only invite rent-seeking but could actually reduce them as 
well, a cultural steward would need to carefully balance its joint aims of promoting 
access and generating revenues, by, for example, having a mission to enable rather 
than prohibit appropriately public-interest furthering uses.156 
In this conception, authors could reclaim their rights from the author’s domain at 
any time.  If, for example, a work found a new audience from its inclusion therein, 
it would be a matter of the author giving appropriate notice to any current licensees 
(ascertainable from the registry) and re-asserting full copyright.  This again differs 
from the U.S. termination for post-1978 transfers, which disappears entirely if 
authors do not exercise it within the notice window.157  If, say, a prospective 
licensee wanted to ensure exclusivity (or negotiate directly with the author), they 
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could seek out that person, alert her to the value in her work and encourage her to 
register her interest.  
3. Foreign Works: 
Figure 5: Depicting the fundamentals of the proposed alternative bargain as it would apply 
to foreign works 
 
For foreign works, the scope for change is considerably narrower.  As described 
above, the scope of grants could still be limited to twenty-five years duration, 
followed by reversion to authors.  Given Berne/TRIPS’ flexibilities around 
ownership, transfers and exclusive grants could also be required to be registered.  
The ownership information in that registry could then be used to encourage foreign 
authors to also register their ongoing interests upon the termination of transfer.  
However, foreign authors could not be required to do so without contravening 
Berne’s Article 5.  And, for that vast majority of works that was never transferred, 
registration could not be required at all.  As is currently the case now, bulk 
licensing of rights would likely need to rely on collective management 
organisations in foreign states to administer reverted rights domestically (e.g. to 
facilitate mass uses of academic publishing).  Authors could also voluntarily opt in 
to domestic collective management.  We would need to combine that with 
appropriate mechanisms for dealing with orphan works in much the same way as 
we need to do under current approaches.  
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IV. THE BACK DOOR IN AND THE FRONT DOOR OUT: 
POSSIBILITIES FOR SUBVERSION AND GROWTH 
A. SUBVERTING AUTHOR-PROTECTIVE LAWS:  THE “BACK DOOR” IN? 
The alternative bargain sketched above relies on various elements requiring 
domestic departure from Berne, as permitted under the principle of independence of 
protection.158  That makes determination of works’ country of origin a matter of 
crucial importance—and raises possibilities for subversion that need to be 
addressed.159 
Article 5(4) provides that a work’s country of origin is the country where it is 
first published, or, where it is published simultaneously (i.e. within thirty days of 
first publication) in multiple Union countries, by the country with the shortest 
term.160  The rules took their current form in 1967’s Stockholm Act, when the 
Union comprised just fifty-eight members, and have since remained unchanged.161 
Berne permits members to regulate their own works according to domestic law, 
but requires them to accord minima-satisfying coverage to foreign Union works.162  
If any country was to mandate a seriously author-protective scheme such as the one 
sketched within this paper, opportunistic investors would no doubt seek to bypass it 
by manipulating the country of first publication and taking the “back door” in to 
treatment as a foreign work.  If investors simply first published in Country B at 
least thirty days before publishing in Country A, would that force Country A to 
afford its own nationals’ works treatment as foreign works?  If so, it could seriously 
hamper Country A in introducing the broader registration requirements that would 
support rights clearance and provide the catch-all that would fund and make 
workable the system described within this paper—as well as weaken Berne’s core 
principle of independence of protection. 
However, it is not at all clear that this Article 5 would be thus subvertable.  
Berne does not specify what happens where a work’s country of origin differs from 
an author’s country of nationality.163  It has been argued that such cases might be 
treatable as having two countries of origin—that of first publication and that of 
nationality.164  As Ginsburg and Ricketson explain, “the basis of the suggestion is 
the assumption that the Berne Convention is not to be interpreted as breaking the 
bonds between Union countries and their citizens, as it is only concerned with the 
relations of Union countries to foreign authors.”165 
 
 158. See Berne Convention, supra note 113, arts. 5(1), 5(3). 
 159. I develop these issues in more detail elsewhere:  see Rebecca Giblin, ‘A future of 
international copyright? Berne and the front door out’ in Interconnected Intellectual Property (Graeme 
Austin, Andrew Christie, Andrew Kenyon and Megan Richardson eds., forthcoming 2018). 
 160. Id. art. 3(4). 
 161. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 121, 278–81. 
 162. Id. at 287. 
 163. Id. at 283. 
 164. Id. at 283–84 (citation omitted). 
 165. Id. at 284. 
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If a country was to adopt this interpretation, and regulate their own nationals’ 
works regardless of place of first publication, that would be effectively 
challengeable only by another Union member bringing an action via WTO dispute 
settlement mechanisms.  This is an unlikely prospect.  In over two decades of 
operation, TRIPS has seen very little litigation so far—even in cases where breach 
and damage were clear.  Here, they would be murky at best.  Further, the 
mechanisms that might be complained of are ones that, by directly supporting 
authors and facilitating exploitation, would directly support the aims of both Berne 
and TRIPS.  Any such challenger would also be on the wrong side of the powerful 
author-protective rhetoric discussed earlier in this paper. 
B. WHAT ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR TAKING IT FURTHER? THE FRONT DOOR 
OUT 
The above shows that there is nothing to prevent a country from choosing to 
regulate its own works in ways that depart from Berne/TRIPS—and that we have 
reached a point where it may well make sense to do so.  Thus, just as there was a 
back door into Berne, so too there is a front door out.  
However, even if a country was to implement an author-protective copyright law 
with elements of domestic Berne departure, that only takes us so far.  Copyright is 
territorial.  An enacting country could apply the scheme within its own borders, and 
defeat attempts to bypass them via application of other jurisdictions’ contract 
law.166  But still, private international law problems would arise from individual 
nations seeking to enforce author-protective copyright laws beyond their borders, 
meaning that the benefits of this reimagined bargain could likely be achieved only 
for its nationals and others who publish there.  How could it be taken further? 
Article 20 only permits Union members to enter into future international 
agreements where they do not detract from Berne’s prohibitions and minimums.  
That prevents countries from agreeing to depart from Berne’s minima for each 
other’s nationals.  However, there is nothing to stop them from agreeing to each 
regulate their own nationals in a harmonized and cooperative way—that happens 
to involve elements of domestic departure from Berne.  If a few significant 
copyright-producing countries were to take the front door out together, and each 
implement an alternative copyright bargain of the kind I have described, the impact 
could be dramatic.  Significantly, they could share their domestic registries to 
create a comprehensive treaty-compatible ownership database.  Rights would be 
freed up to give authors a bigger slice of the pie and support new distribution 
models and markets.  And instead of the default being that we lose most of our 
artefactual heritage as collateral damage to investors hoping to one day strike the 
jackpot, it would be there to nourish the next generations of authors. 
 
 166. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg & Pierre Sirinelli, Private International Law Aspects of 
Authors’ Contracts: The Dutch and French Examples, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 171 (2015) (discussing 
private international law issues arising in the copyright context, including the territorial complexities 
introduced by the Internet). 
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I do not pretend that the idea of an author-focused international instrument 
incorporating elements of domestic Berne departure is anything but radical.  But it 
might be that we eventually reach a point where that becomes the best remaining 
way to get authors paid, reclaim our lost culture, and move past that incessant 
mournful lament of, “but Berne doesn’t let us do that.” 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Given how significantly copyright’s costs and benefits have changed since 
TRIPS was settled, it’s remarkable that we have done so little to change the 
bargain’s fundamentals.  The paths Berne and TRIPS have left open to meaningful 
reform are admittedly narrow and even tortuous.  As I have shown however, there 
are steps we can take towards more enabling conceptions of the treaties, in order to 
better satisfy both their own objectives and domestic policy interests. 
The alternative I sketched here is not the one I would have drawn had I been free 
of constraints.167  However, built upon updated assumptions that better reflect that 
world we actually inhabit today, it holds out new possibilities for doing a better job 
of incentivising works’ initial creation and ongoing availability while 
simultaneously securing more rewards to authors. 
I am currently leading a project to empirically test some of the key hypotheses 
set out in this work.  In the medium-term, that work will cast new light on how the 
Berne/TRIPS flexibilities, particularly around ownership, can help solve 
copyright’s most vexing problems.  In the meantime, this analysis might assist in 
two ways.  First, it encourages readers to challenge claims about the law’s current 
operation and effects of proposed reforms.  Second, it demonstrates how taking 
authors’ interests seriously can open pathways to greater access for the broader 
public too—showing the falseness of the “authors vs. users” dichotomy and taking 
advantage of copyright’s non-zero-sum potential. 
 
 167. Giblin, supra note 3. 
